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CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS: GOVERNANCE CHANGE
THROUGH GLOBALIZATION?
Li-Wen Lin *
China is regarded as the world’s leading practitioner of state
capitalism in which important capitalist enterprises have a close
relationship with the state. One prominent feature of China’s state
capitalism is the fundamental role of about 100 large state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) controlled by organs of the central government in
critical industries such as oil, telecom, and transportation. These SOEs are
often dubbed “China’s national champions.” They are not only important
players in China’s domestic economy but also major contributors to
China’s fast-growing global investment. Their global expansion however
often encounters political and regulatory challenges abroad, partly because
their corporate governance practices are opaque and often deviant from
international standards. Prevailing theories suggest that political and
regulatory pressure arising from institutional distance between China and
host countries (particularly advanced economies such as the United States)
may act as an effective force to push for SOE governance change.
Empirical findings in this Article however indicate that the development of
global equity connections that potentially expose SOEs to foreign
institutional pressure seems virtually irrelevant to the reform patterns of
these most important non-financial SOEs in China. The absence of
correlation may be related to investment structure and geography,
investment motives, and importantly, China’s domestic political institutions.
This Article offers insights into the perennial scholarly debate about the
future of national corporate governance systems in the era of globalization
and also provides practical recommendations for Chinese and international
policymakers

* Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Peter A. Allard School of Law. . JSD,
PhD (sociology). I am grateful for financial support by Columbia University and the TMX
Group (the holding company of the Toronto Stock Exchange). I appreciate comments on the
previous draft by Josh Whitford, David Stark, Dan Wang and Curtis Milhaupt.
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I.
Introduction
The downfall of Eastern European socialism and the softening of
Chinese communism in the 1980s appeared to conclusively declare a
victory of free market capitalism. The victory however turns out to be rather
uncertain as the twenty-first century unfolds. The financial crisis in 2008
unabashedly disgraced liberal capitalism. The U.S. economy, the champion
of free market, even resorted to government ownership for relief.
Meanwhile, as noted in the Economist, “[t]he crisis of Western liberal
capitalism has coincided with the rise of a powerful new form of [state]
capitalism in emerging markets,” 1 frequently described as state capitalism.
It is now often, albeit subject to debate, characterized as “a system in which
governments use state-owned companies and investment vehicles to
dominate market activity.” 2
China is regarded as the world’s leading practitioner of state
capitalism. One prominent feature of China’s state capitalism is the
fundamental role of about 100 large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under
the central government’s control in “critical industries such as oil, steel,
telecom, and transportation.” 3 These SOEs are often dubbed “China’s
national champions.” Many of them, including China National Petroleum
Corporation and China Mobile Communications Corporation, are Fortune
Global 500 companies (the world’s largest 500 companies by revenues). 4
1

Adrian Woolridge, The Visible Hand, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931.
2
Ian Bremmer & Devin T. Stewart, China’s State Capitalism Poses Ethical Challenges,
TIMES,
Aug.
17,
2010,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/
ASIA
LH17Cb01.html.
3 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 725 (2013).
4 Id.
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These SOEs are not only prominent companies in China’s domestic
economy, but also active players in the field of global investment. At
present, China is the third largest country, behind the United States and
Japan, with respect to outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flow. 5
Notably, a massive portion of China’s outward FDI is contributed by the
national champions. 6
In recent years, Chinese SOEs’ global expansion has aroused great
controversies in host countries. State ownership often raises the specter of
undue government influence in SOE management, which may pose threats
to the host country’s national interests. This concern is exacerbated by the
fact that Chinese SOEs have low transparency and their actual corporate
governance practices usually deviate from international standards. In
response, some host countries including Australia, Canada and the United
States have welcomed Chinese SOEs with great caution through (usually
politicized) regulatory reviews. 7 Often, the regulators scrutinize the
acquiring SOE’s corporate governance quality and sometimes may
condition their approval by requiring the SOE to adopt certain governance
practices. 8
As China’s national champions continue to globalize, it raises
important questions about how their governance would change in the face
of mounting political and regulatory pressure in host countries. Specifically
speaking, can exposure to international environments serve as an effective
mechanism for Chinese national champions to learn and converge on
prevailing international corporate governance practices? Do foreign
investment regulatory regimes in the United States and other countries play
any significant role in modernizing governance practices of Chinese SOEs?
Does Chinese SOEs’ global expansion through subsidiaries or other
channels diffuse any positive effects back to their parent companies
headquartered in Beijing?
The pursuit of these questions will shed some light on the perennial
scholarly debate about the trajectory of national corporate governance
systems in the age of globalization. It will also make an interdisciplinary
contribution. Researchers of international business typically focus on how
5

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2014 – Investing
in the SDGs: An Action Plan, 7, UNCTAD/WIR/2014, (June 24, 2014),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf [hereinafter World Investment
Report 2014].
6 See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, REPORT ON CHINA’S
OUTWARD INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION 2011-2012, at 117 (reporting that
70.5% of China’s FDI flow was contributed by the SOEs controlled by the central
government; also see Section II for more detailed information discussing the role of China’s
National Champions).
7
See Section III (analyzing the regulatory challenges abroad).
8 See infra Table 2 (discussing major countries that have a regulatory system of foreign
investment).
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corporate governance structures including ownership structure, 9 board
composition, 10 top management team, 11 and executive compensation 12
influence a firm’s internationalization strategies. Little attention has been
paid to the flipside of this research inquiry, namely how the investing firm
located in the home country may change its governance practices as a result
of internationalization. 13 This Article attempts to fill this void by
investigating Chinese national champions’ government reform pattern in
the course of globalization. Beyond scholarly contributions, this Article has
practical policy implications. It provides a better understanding of whether
and how to utilize globalization to improve the SOE reform in China.
Moreover, it provides better knowledge for international investors and
regulators as to how to implement foreign investment regulations to develop
mutually beneficial relationships with China’s SOEs.
This Article draws on network and institutional theories in
sociology, the approaches commonly adopted in relevant international
business studies, to hypothesize the relationship between international
investment and governance reform patterns of the 100 or so non-financial
SOEs under the Chinese central government’s control. It predicts that
outward investment will create inward influence on SOE governance,
especially when the SOE invests in a foreign regime that has much higher
corporate governance standards than its home regime, and the degree of
influence is mediated through different investment structures. This
theoretical thinking however seems to have limited explanatory power for
Chinese national champions. The empirical findings in this Article indicate
that international exposure to strong corporate governance regimes and
investment regulatory systems hostile to foreign SOEs (e.g. Australia,
Canada and the United States) appears virtually irrelevant to the reform
patterns of these most important non-financial SOEs in China. This Article
offers a number of possible explanations for the absence of correlation
9 Gabriel R. G. Benito et al., Distant Encounters of the Third Kind: Multinational Companies
Locating Divisional Headquarters Abroad, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 373, 373 (2011); Sumon
Kumar Bhaumik et al., Does Ownership Structure of Emerging-Market Firms Affect Their
Outward FDI? The Case of the Indian Automotive and Pharmaceutical Sectors, 41 J. INT’L
BUS. STUD. 437, 437 (2009).
10 Igor Filatotchev & Mike Wright, Agency Perspectives on Corporate Governance of
Multinational, Enterprises, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 471, 471 (2011); Yung-Chih Lien et al., The
Role of Corporate Governance in FDI Decisions: Evidence from Taiwan, 14 INT’L BUS. REV.
739, 739 (2005).
11 Laszlo Tihanyi et al, Composition of the Top Management Team and Firm International
Diversification, 26 J. MGMT. 1157, 1157 (2000).
12 WM. Gerard Sanders & Mason A. Carpenter, Internationalization and Firm Governance:
The Roles of CEO Compensation, Top Team Composition, and Board Structure, 41 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 158, 158 (1998).
13 See Nai H. Wu & Laszlo Tihanyi, Corporate Governance, Multinational Firms, and
Internationalization, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Mar. 2013, at 449464 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013) (noting that extant research on multinational firms
unfortunately has limited integration with corporate governance).
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between internationalization and governance reform. Among other reasons,
investment structures and investment geography pose obstacles to
transmitting positive governance effects back to the (ultimate) parent SOEs.
Moreover, SOE governance reform is a result more of the Chinese
government’s central planning than market behavior decided at the firm
level. The popular hypothesis that internationalization leads to governance
reform is founded on market-driven logic, and it does not apply well to the
SOEs that are deeply embedded in the state system.
This Article is organized as follows. Section II provides an
overview of the organizational structure of China’s national champions and
their magnitude in China’s globalization scheme. Their organizational
structure forms a corporate network through which influence may possibly
be transmitted. In Section III, this Article reviews foreign investment
regulations in some major countries and recent controversial investments
involving Chinese SOEs. The review identifies which regulatory
jurisdictions may pose institutional pressure on Chinese SOEs in their
course of globalization. Section IV hypothesizes how globalization through
international investment may influence an investing SOE’s governance
practices based on the popular assumption that firms are responsive to
international market and institutional disparity pressure. Section V offers
preliminary empirical evidence concerning the 113 non-financial SOEs
under the Chinese central government’s control as of the end of 2013.
Section VI discusses scholarly and policy implications. Section VII finally
concludes with questions for future research.
II.

Globalizing China’s National Champions

China is not only a major recipient of FDI but also has become a
significant FDI source. China’s outward FDI flow (excluding Hong Kong)
increased from $2.3 billion in 2000 to $101 billion in 2013, ranking as the
country with the third largest outward FDI flow in the world, behind the
United States and Japan. 14 This astonishing growth in outward FDI is
mainly contributed by the government’s “going global” policy, formally
launched in 2000, which encourages Chinese firms to invest aboard. Under
this policy, the Chinese government provides financial and diplomatic
resources, particularly for SOEs to go on a shopping spree acquiring
prominent companies and valuable assets worldwide. 15

14
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting
Linkages,
298,
UNCTAD/WIF/2001,
(Sept.
17,
2001),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2001_en.pdf; World Investment Report 2014, supra note 5, at
205.
15 It has been estimated that 95-97% of the outward foreign investment lending provided by
the policy banks in China went to the SOEs. See Amos Irwin & Keven P. Gallagher,
Exporting National Champions: China’s OFDI Finance in Comparative Perspective (B.U.
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As of 2013, wholly government-owned SOEs accounted for 55.2%
of China’s non-financial outward investment stock. 16 It has been estimated
that SOEs of all kinds, including wholly- and partially-state controlled,
contributed approximately 85-90% of China’s outward FDI. 17 A vast
majority of China’s top 100 companies by outward FDI stock and flow are
SOEs wholly owned by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration (SASAC), the central government’s ownership agency.
Table 1 below shows a list of the top twenty non-financial Chinese firms by
outward investment stock as of 2012. All the top twenty contributors are
SOEs owned by SASAC. 18
Table 1: Top 20 Non-Financial Chinese Enterprises by Outward Investment
Stock, 2012 19
Rank

Name of Enterprise

Industry

Ownership

1

China Petrochemical Corporation
(Sinopec)

Petroleum

SOE under
SASAC

2

China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC)

Petroleum

SOE under
SASAC

Global Econ. Governance Initiative, Working Paper No. 6, 2014) (discussing the financial
role of the state in relation to China’s outward foreign direct investment).
16 2013 Niandu Zhongguo Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Tongji Gongbao (2013 年度中国外直接
投公报) [2013 Statistical Bulletin Of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics, and State
Administration of Foreign Exchange of People’s Republic of China, Sept. 9, 2014),
http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjzl/jwtz/201409/1838257_1.html.
Note that in the
government’s report, state-owned enterprises refer to those 100% owned by the government;
it does not include partially state-owned SOEs.
17
Limin Zhang, Wenbu Tisheng Guoyou Qiye de Guojihua Jingying Nengli (步提升国
有 企  的 国  化   能 力 ) [Steadily Improving SOEs’ International Management
Capability], CHINA ECON. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A05 (noting that the official
government’s report underestimated the SOE’s share in outward FDI because it does not
account for partially-owned SOEs and according to KPMG’s data, SOEs accounted for 88%
of China’s overseas mergers and acquisitions for the period of 2009-2011; therefore
reporting estimate that SOEs should account for 85%-90% of China’s outward FDI stock).
18
2012 Nian Zhongguo Fei Jinrong Lei Kuaguo Gongsi 100 Qiang (An 2012 Nianmo
Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Cunliang Paixu) (2012 年中国非金融跨国公司 100 (按 2012 年
末  外 直 接 投  存 量 排 序 )) [The Top 100 China’s Non-Financial Multinational
Companies in 2012 (Arranged by Direct Outward Investment Stock)] (promulgated by the
Ministry
of
Commerce,
Sept.
16,
2013),
http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjzl/jwtz/201309/1775847_1.html.
19 MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 2012 STATISTICAL BULLETIN
OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI.
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China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC)

Petroleum

SOE under
SASAC

4

China Mobile Communication
Corporation

Telecom

SOE under
SASAC

5

Chin Resources (Holdings) Co.,
Ltd.

Diversified

SOE under
SASAC

6

China Ocean Shipping (Group)
Company (COSCO)

Transportation

SOE under
SASAC

7

Aluminum Corporation of China

Metal

SOE under
SASAC

8

Sinochem Corporation

Chemical

SOE under
SASAC

9

China Merchant Group

Diversified

SOE under
SASAC

10

China State Construction
Engineering Corporation

Construction

SOE under
SASAC

11

China Unicom Corporation

Telecom

SOE under
SASAC

12

China Minmetals Corporation

Metal

SOE under
SASAC

13

China National Chemical
Corporation

Chemical

SOE under
SASAC

14

CITIC Group

Diversified

SOE under
SASAC

15

China National Cereals, Oils &
Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO)

Food

SOE under
SASAC

16

China National Aviation Holding
Corporation

Transportation

SOE under
SASAC

17

State Grid Corporation of China

Utility

SOE under
SASAC

18

SinoSteel Corporation

Metal

SOE under
SASAC

19

China Three Gorges Corporation

Utility

SOE under
SASAC

20

Sinotrans & CSC Holdings Co.,
Ltd.

Logistics

SOE under
SASAC
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At present, there are 112 SOEs under SASAC’s control. These
SOEs are recognized as China’s national champions. They are organized
as vertically integrated corporate groups. Each corporate group has a
holding company standing at the top of the ownership hierarchy. The
holding company is 100% owned by SASAC. All the companies reported
in Table 1 are the holding company of a state-owned corporate group. Each
holding company controls a large number of subsidiaries including listed
companies, finance companies, research institutes, and many other related
firms along the production chain. 20
It has been noted that the holding company has many governance
features that diverge from prevailing international standards.21 For instance,
at the time of this writing, only about half of the 112 holding companies
have successfully established a board of directors. SASAC and the
Organization Department (i.e. the human resources department) of the
Chinese Communist Party exercise the power of appointing top managers
of the holding companies. “Political qualities,” including loyalty to the
Chinese Communist Party, are among the major criteria of managerial
performance evaluation. 22 The holding companies’ close connection with
the government obviously raises concerns in host countries. Even if a
holding company utilizes a listed subsidiary as an investment vehicle, it may
not shed governance doubts because the holding company often is the
absolute majority shareholder of the listed subsidiary. 23 As shown in the
following section, regulators in some advanced economies including
20 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 710-711 fig.1 (2013).
Figure 1 in Lin & Milhaupt’s article well illustrates the organizational structure:
State Council
Chinese Communist Party
(exercising shadow control rights)
SASAC
(exercising rights
as an investor)
100%
Holding Company
(core company in the group)
>50%

>50%
Other National
or Provincial
Corporate
Groups

>50%

>50%

Major Subsidiaries Finance Other
Research
(publicly traded) Company Subsidiaries Institutes
Subsidiaries

Noneconomic
Institutions
(universities,
etc.)

Group Boundary

21

Id. at 752.
Zhongyang Qiye Lingdao Banzi He Lingdao Renyuan Zonghe Kaohe Pingjia Banfa
(Shixing) ( 中 央 企    班 子 和   人   合 考 核  价  法 (  行 )) [Measures
Concerning the Integrated Evaluation of the Top Management Teams and Managers of the
Central Enterprises (Provisional)] (promulgated by the Org. Dep’t Communist Party of
China, Nov. 6, 2009), http://gzw.xinjiang.gov.cn/10050/10090/10012/2010/19547.htm.
23 Erica Downs, China’s NOCs: Lessons Learned from Adventures Abroad, FUNDAMENTALS
GLOBAL
OIL
AND
GAS
INDUSTRY
2008,
at
30,
OF
THE
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2008/7/chinadowns/07_china_downs.pdf. (arguing that foreign investors cannot differentiate the holding
and the listed subsidiary as the holding controls an absolute majority).
22
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Australia, Canada, and the United States have frustrated several potential
takeovers by Chinese SOEs. In the face of legitimacy challenges, do
China’s national champions change their governance practices as they
globalize? Do the regulatory regimes in some host countries exert any
effective influence on the governance reform of China’s national champions?
III.

Regulatory Challenges Abroad

Host countries are usually ambivalent toward FDI. On the one
hand, FDI is perceived desirable as it promotes economic development.
On the other hand, a foreign investor may favor the interests of its home
country or parent company to the detriment of national interests of the
host country. To balance economic benefits and national interest
concerns, many countries have regulatory regimes to scrutinize investment
by foreign entities. Table 2 below shows a list of major countries that
have a regulatory system of foreign investment.
Table 2: Comparison of Foreign Investment Regulatory Regimes 24
Country

Australia

Sources of
Law and
Responsible
Regulator
Foreign
Acquisitions
and
Takeover
Act 1975
(FETA);
Foreign
Acquisitions
and
Takeover
Regulations
1989;
Australia’s
Foreign
Investment
Policy
(AFIP).
Treasurer;
Foreign
Investment
Review
Board
(FIRB).

24

Key
Concerns

“National
interest”
including
national
security,
competition,
other
Australian
Government
Policies
(including
tax), impact
on the
economy and
the
community,
character of
the investor.

Corporate
Governance as
an Explicit
Factor in Review
When considering
“the character of
the investor”, the
government
considers “the
corporate
governance
practices of
foreign investors.”
(AFIP)

Special Regulation
for Foreign SOEs

High-Profiled
Troubled Cases
against Chinese SOEs

All foreign
government investors
must notify the
Government and get
prior approval before
making a direct
investment in
Australia, regardless
of the value of the
investment.

Minmetals/ OZ
Minerals (2009):
approval conditioned
on excluding the
Prominent Hill mine,
based on national
security as it is located
close to a sensitive
military zone in the
deserts of outback
South Australia.

Where a proposal
involves a foreign
government investor,
the Government
considers if the
investment is
commercial in nature
or if the investor may
be pursuing broader
political or strategic
objectives that may
be contrary to
Australia’s national
interest. This
includes assessing
whether the
prospective
investor’s
governance

Chinalco/Rio Tino
(2009): as the
international
commodity markets
greatly improved
during the prolonged
regulatory approval
process, Rio Tino
unilaterally ended the
deal one week before
the regulator’s meeting
to decide on the deal.

Information about the regulations in France, Germany and Japan is from United States
Government Accountability Office, Laws and Policies Regulating Foreign Investment in 10
Countries, (Feb, 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08320.pdf.

90

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11
arrangements could
facilitate actual or
potential control by a
foreign government.
(AFIP)

Canada

Investment
Canada Act
1985;
Regulations
Respecting
Investment
in Canada;
National
Security
Review of
Investments
Regulations.

“Net benefit”
to Canada
(including
economic
impact) and
national
security

Industry
Canada;
Canadian
Heritage.

USA

Exon-Florio
Amendment
to the
Defense
Production
Act of 1950,
as
Amended;
Guidance
Concerning
the National
Security
Review
Conducted
by the
Committee
on Foreign
Investment
in the United
States
The Foreign
Investment
and National
Security Act

National
Security

When assessing
whether a deal is
of net benefit to
Canada, the
Minister will
examine the
corporate
governance and
reporting structure
of the nonCanadian. This
examination will
include whether
the non-Canadian
adheres to
Canadian
standards of
corporate
governance
(including, for
example,
commitments to
transparency and
disclosure,
independent
members of the
board of directors,
independent audit
committees and
equitable
treatment of
shareholders), and
to Canadian laws
and practices,
including
adherence to free
market principles.
(The SOE
Guidelines)
When evaluating
transactions by
foreign
governmentcontrolled entities,
CFIUS considers,
among other
factors, “whether
governance
structures are in
place to ensure
independence.”
(The CFIUS
Guidance)

“Guidelines on
Investment by StateOwned Enterprises”
(The SOE
Guidelines, first
issued in 2007;
amended in 2012)
The Minister will
assess whether a
Canadian business to
be acquired by a nonCanadian that is an
SOE will likely
operate on a
commercial basis,
including with regard
to: where to export;
where to process; the
participation of
Canadians in its
operations in Canada
and elsewhere;
the impact of the
investment on
productivity and
industrial efficiency
in Canada; support of
on-going innovation,
research and
development in
Canada; and the
appropriate level of
capital expenditures
to maintain the
Canadian business in
a globally
competitive position.
In reviewing foreign
governmentcontrolled
transactions, CFIUS
considers, among all
other relevant facts
and circumstances,
the extent to which
the basic investment
management policies
of the investor
require investment
decisions to be based
solely on commercial
grounds; the degree
to which, in practice,
the investor’s
management and
investment decisions
are exercised
independently from
the controlling
government,
including whether
governance

CNOOC/Nexen
(2012): approval
conditioned on
CNOOC’s
commitment to some
undertakings including
listing CNOOC on the
Toronto Stock
Exchange.

CNOOC/Unocal
(2005): CNOOC
withdrew its bid in the
midst of intensive
political opposition
played out in Congress
and dissatisfaction
with the CFIUS review
process; its competing
bidder, Chevron, won
the deal at the end.
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structures are in
place to ensure
independence; the
degree of
transparency and
disclosure of the
purpose, investment
objectives,
institutional
arrangements, and
financial information
of the investor; and
the degree to which
the investor complies
with applicable
regulatory and
disclosure
requirements of the
countries in which
they invest. (The
CFIUS Guidance)

Committee
on Foreign
Investment
in the United
States
(CFIUS).

EU

Currently
there is no
foreign
investment
review at the
EU level.

None

None

None

None

France

Law 20041343;
Decree
2005-1739

Public order,
public safety,
national
Defense

None

None

None

Germany

2004
Amendment
to
1961Foreign
Trade and
Payments
Act.

Ensure
essential
security
interests,
prevent
disturbance
of peaceful
international
coexistence
or foreign
relations

None

None

None

Japan

1991
Amendment
to the
Foreign
Exchange
and Foreign
Trade Act of
1949.

National
security,
public order,
public safety,
or the
economy

None

None

None

While each country has unique characteristics in its own system to
regulate foreign investment, in many ways the systems are quite similar to
each other. Although the regulatory scope varies significantly, regulations
that restrict foreign investment are generally based on national security. For
instance, Australia, Canada, and Japan also formally include economic
concerns as part of the criteria for foreign investment reviews. At present,
there is no foreign investment regulation at the EU level, but there are some
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variations among European countries. France and Germany have regulatory
reviews based on national security, whereas countries including Belgium,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, and the Netherlands (not
shown in Table) do not have any investment regulations related to national
security interests. 25
Australia, Canada and the United States probably have the most
detailed regulations and relatively active records in coping with investment
by foreign SOEs. In Australia, all investments by foreign governmentcontrolled entities are subject to regulatory review, regardless the size of the
investment. 26 Investments by other entities are reviewable only when the
transaction involves certain sectors and are above a certain monetary
threshold. 27
In Canada, the regulatory regime operates under the Investment
Canada Act. 28 When a foreign investor acquires control of a Canadian
business and the asset value of the Canadian business being acquired equals
or exceeds a certain threshold, the foreign investor must prove that the
investment is of net benefit to Canada. 29 In 2007, Industry Canada
promulgated the SOE Guidelines under the Act partly as a reaction to
growing public concerns over foreign SOEs’ acquisition of controlling
stakes in prominent Canadian businesses. 30 In 2009, the Investment Canada
Act was amended to allow the government to block foreign investments
based on national security concerns. 31 Recently, in 2012, the Canadian
government further revised the SOE Guidelines and increased scrutiny,
along with the announcement of approving the contentious acquisitions by
Petronas and CNOOC. 32 The latest guidelines broaden the definition of
SOE, covering any “enterprise that is owned, controlled or influenced,
directly or indirectly by a foreign government.” 33
In the United States, parties to a transaction that could result in
control of a U.S. business by a foreign person may file a notice with the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to
determine whether such transaction would present any national security
risks. As stated in the CFIUS Guidance, foreign government control is
obviously an important factor though it does not necessarily, in itself, pose
25 Angela Huyue Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility, 34
NORTHWESTERN J. INT’L L. & BUS. 395, 433 (2014).
26
Australia’s
Foreign
Investment
Policy
2015,
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/_downloads/Australias_Foreign_Investment_Policy_June_
2015.pdf.
27
Id.
28 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28.
29 Investment Canada Act Guidelines – Investment by State-Owned Enterprises,
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#p2.
30 Id.
31
Id.
32 Id.
33
Id.
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a national security risk. 34 Other factors such as whether appropriate
corporate governance structure is in place to ensure the investing entity’s
independence of the foreign government shall be considered as well. 35
Similar to the United States, both Australia and Canada include corporate
governance structure, among other things, as an important concern. 36
In recent years, a number of prominent Chinese SOEs have
encountered regulatory challenges in Australia, Canada, and the United
States. Loosely defined regulatory concepts, including national security
and interests in foreign investment regulations, provide ample political
space to galvanize public debate in the host country. For instance, in 2005,
CNOOC Limited (a listed subsidiary of an oil SOE under SASAC’s control)
attempted to acquire Unocal, a U.S. oil producer. The CNOOC-Unocal deal
faced unprecedented political opposition by the U.S. Congress based on the
claims that the takeover would threaten US national security. Congress,
through its legislative power, significantly dragged the CFIUS review
process. The politicized regulatory review process eventually forced
CNOOC to retreat from the bidding war and the American-owned Chevron
Corporation won the deal. 37
The Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal in Australia faced a similar challenge.
In 2009, Chinalco, one of the SOEs under SASAC, planned to acquire an
18% stake of Anglo-Australian mining giant, Rio Tinto. But the regulatory
process was prolonged in the debate of the consequences of giving Chinese
SOEs access to an enormous trove of natural resources in Australia. Rio
Tinto unilaterally terminated the deal just days before Australian regulators
were expected to impose tough conditions for their approval of it. 38
Another prominent case in Australia was the sale of OZ Minerals to China
Minmetals Non Ferrous Metals Co., Ltd (Minmetals), a subsidiary of China
Minmetals Corporation. China Minmetals Corporation is a central SOE
under SASAC’s control. The Australian government announced that it
would not approve the transaction if it included the Prominent Hill
operation based on national security concerns. A subsequent agreement
was reached whereby Minmetals would purchase OZ Minerals assets except
for Prominent Hill. 39

34
Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS, 73 Fed. Reg.
74567, 74571 (Dec. 8, 2008).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING TIDE, RISING STAKES,
ch. 5 (2006).
38 Dana Cimilluca et al., Rio Tinto Scuttles Its Deal with Chinalco, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124411140142684779.
39 Peter Smith, Oz Minerals Shareholders Accept Minmetals Bid, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9056355a-559f-11de-ab7e00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rOmaygK9.
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Recently, CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen also aroused great public
concerns in Canada. After a delayed review process, the Canadian
government finally approved the deal with conditions including requiring
CNOOC’s listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange. These conditions were
meant to ensure that CNOOC's corporate governance and transparency were
in compliance with Canadian standards. 40
An overview of the foreign investment laws shows that a foreign
SOE’s relation with the government in its home country is the root of
regulatory concerns. Does a foreign SOE act as an independent enterprise
for commercial interests or as an agent of the foreign government pursuing
political interests? Regulatory regimes often consider whether adequate
corporate governance structure is in place to shield the SOE management
from interference by its home country government. If a foreign SOE’s
governance structure demonstrates independence of its home country
government, the SOE will be more likely to obtain regulatory approval and
public support in the host country. It suggests that the regulatory regimes
scrutinizing investment by foreign SOEs may act as a potential mechanism
to change investing foreign SOEs’ corporate governance. The following
section proposes a framework to analyze how institutional environments
including corporate governance and foreign investment regulatory
institutions in the host country may affect the governance of foreign SOEs.
Based on this analytical framework, this Article will make hypotheses
regarding whether globalization through foreign investment and overseas
listing may prompt Chinese national champions to change their corporate
governance practices.

IV.

Theoretical Framework of Globalization and Governance
Change

Relevant international business studies have investigated how
institutional distance between the home country and the host country would
affect a firm’s entry modes and subsequent performance of the investment
vehicle in the host country. 41 This body of literature often draws on
sociological theories to explain institutional disparity between the home
country and the host country as an important determinant of a firm’s
40

Shawn Mccarthy and Steven Chase, Ottawa Approves Nexen, Progress Foreign Takeover,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globeinvestor/ottawa-approves-nexen-progress-foreign-takeovers/article6107548/.
41 Majid Abdi & Preet S. Aulakh, Do Country-Level Institutional Frameworks and Interfirm
Governance Arrangements Substitute or Complement in International Business
Relationships? 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 477, 477 (2012); Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, State
Ownership Effect on Firms’ FDI Ownership Decisions under Institutional Pressure: A Study
of Chinese Outward-Investing Firms, 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 264, 264 (2012); Klaus E Meyer
et al., Overcoming Distrust: How State-Owned Enterprises Adapt Their Foreign Entries to
Institutional Pressures Abroad, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1005, 1020 (2014).
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strategy to enter the foreign country. Existing literature, however, has paid
little attention to how a company’s outward investment would create
inbound influence on the company itself. This inattention is explainable as
the dominant players in the global investment market have traditionally
been firms in advanced economies. Firms in advanced economies have little
reason to emulate immature institutions in less developed countries. But
the emergence of multinational firms from China and other developing
countries calls for an evaluation of any effects in the reverse direction.
Following similar sociological thoughts in the international business
literature, this Article uses network analysis and institutional theories in
economic sociology to build an analytical framework of how a firm may
change its corporate governance practices due to institutional pressure faced
in the host country. This Article will apply this framework to hypothesize
how “going global” may influence Chinese national champions’
governance practices.
Sociological network analysis is based on a fundamental
assumption that interactions between social actors (whether individuals,
organizations, or nations) shape their behavior. Social actors are viewed as
interdependent, linking with one another by social ties through which
information and other resources are channeled. 42 For instance, firms may
be linked with one another though ownership ties (i.e. holding shares in
another firm) or interlocking directorships (i.e. two firms sharing a common
director). Material and non-material resources may flow through the
concrete relationships and influence behavior or outcomes. Rich
sociological evidence shows that inter-firm networks play an important role
in sharing risks and diffusing information. 43
From a sociological network perspective, foreign investment is
relational in the sense that it creates not only flows of money, but also
channels of influence. The relational nature of investment becomes
particularly complex for overseas investment across different institutional
environments. Institutional theory in economic sociology suggests that an
organization’s behavior is influenced by the economic, legal and political
environment in which it operates. 44 This environment creates normative
forces that drive how an organization should operate, regardless of whether
a particular normative practice is useful to the organization’s functioning.
Conformity to institutional expectations helps the organization acquire
42

Mak Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 481 (1985).
43 For a summary of this body of sociological literature, see generally Joel M. Podolny &
Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 57, 57 (1998).
44 For the seminal work of institutional theory in sociology, see generally Paul J. DiMaggio
& Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983); John W. Meyer &
Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83
AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977).
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legitimacy. Different environments impose different normative pressures
and thus produce different organizational structures and behavior. When an
organization born of and operating in a certain environment enters a new
environment, it may be under normative pressure to change its
organizational structures or behavior so as to adapt to and establish
legitimacy in the new environment. The normative pressure may be more
intense when the new environment is dissimilar from the original
environment. 45
As different countries have different institutional environments,
this relational and institutional approach suggests that the potential of a
SOE’s corporate governance change depends on the institutional disparity
between the SOE’s origin country and its investment destination country.
In other words, institutional distance between the origin country and the
destination country of investment matters in evaluating the potential of SOE
governance change. While there are many dimensions of institutional
environments, this Article focuses on corporate governance institutions,
which are a main concern in foreign investment reviews. Table 3 below
illustrates the basic idea.
Table 3: Institutional Distance and the Potential of SOE Governance Change
Destination Country
Strong Corporate
Governance Regime
Origin
Country

Strong
Corporate
Governance
Regime

Weak
Corporate
Governance
Regime

45

Weak Corporate
Governance Regime

(High) Institutional
match  Little
need/pressure to
change/improve
governance

(High) Institutional
mismatch  Little
inbound influence on
governance, but
potentially positive
effects along FDI on
destination countries

(High) Institutional
mismatch  High
suspicion and pressure
to change

(High) Institutional
match  Little
need/pressure to
change/improve
governance

Meyer et al. supra note 41, at 340.
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For analytical convenience, a country can either be a (relatively)
strong governance regime or a (relatively) weak governance regime.
Admittedly, this dichotomous categorization may be oversimplified given
the complexity of assessing the quality of corporate governance institutions.
Several seminal attempts to compare corporate governance across countries
through quantitative indicators have been subject to cautions and
criticisms. 46 The quantitative governance indices present limitations and
inconsistencies among themselves. Nevertheless, their results constantly
show that most developed countries rank high on the indices and most
developing countries including China gravitate toward the bottom. There
should be little controversy if China is placed in the weak governance
category and developed countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United
States in the strong governance category.
When both the origin country and the destination country are of the
same type of governance regime (either strong or weak), it is labeled as an
institutional match. A high degree of institutional match indicates there
would be of little normative pressure on the investing SOE or the investing
state-owner to change its governance practices. In other words, there would
be only marginal inbound influence on the SOE governance from such
outward investment. The institutional match provides a comfort zone for
the SOE to continue its traditional practices even when they operate across
national boundaries. The upper left cell and the lower right cell in Table 3
show the scenarios of institutional match. The upper left cell shows a
scenario in which an SOE from a strong corporate governance regime
invests in a parallel regime. An example is Statoil, a Norwegian oil SOE,
investing in Canada. 47 The lower right cell shows a situation where an SOE
46 The work that sparked using empirical methods in comparative corporate governance is
Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1113 (1998). Efforts on
ranking national corporate governance systems include: GMI, Country Rankings from
Governance Metrics International, http://www.gmiratings.com/BreakingNews.aspx;
WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2001-2014,
http://www.weforum.org/reports; Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, A Corporate
Governance Index: Convergence and Diversity of National Corporate Governance
Regulations
(CentER
Discussion
Paper
Series
No.
2010-17,
2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1557627. For critiques, see Ruth V.
Aguilera & Kurt A. Desender, Challenges in the Measuring of Comparative Corporate
Governance: A Review of the Main Indices, 8 RES. METHODOLOGY IN STRATEGY AND MGMT.
289, 290 (2012) (arguing that there are challenges to compare corporate governance
effectiveness in different settings with a governance index); Sanjai Bhagat et al., The
Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1803 (2008)
(arguing that “governance indices are highly imperfect instruments” for various corporate
issues); Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD.
467, 467 (2010) (arguing that the corrected “antidirector rights index” fails to support widely
influential claims).
47
See
STATOIL,
STATOIL
IN
CANADA:
FACTS,
Statoil
(2014),
http://www.statoil.com/no/About/Worldwide/NorthAmerica/canada/OilSands/Downloads/s
tatoilincanada.pdf (introducing Statoil’s work in Canada).
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from a weak governance regime invests in another weaker regime, such as
Sinopec, a Chinese SOE, investing in Nigeria.
To the contrary, when there is a high degree of institutional
mismatch between the origin country and the destination country,
institutional conformity would be a source of pressure to change governance
practices. But the direction of governance impact runs in different ways,
depending on where the stronger institutions are located. The upper right
cell in Table 3 illustrates a situation where a SOE from a strong governance
regime invests in a weaker regime. An example is Norsk Hydro (controlled
by the Norwegian government), which invests in Mozambique. 48 The
governance impact tends to run in the direction from the better regime to
the weaker regime. The governance implication of this type of investment
has been well-examined in the FDI literature concerning how FDI from
advanced economies benefit (or harm) domestic firms and institutional
development of emerging markets. 49
The lower left cell in Table 3 illustrates a scenario where an SOE
from a weak governance regime invests in a strong regime, such as CNOOC
investing in the United States. As shown in Section III, a number of
advanced economies including Australia, Canada and the United States
have enhanced review standards for foreign SOE investments. Corporate
governance is a main factor considered in these review processes.
Moreover, while the investment review systems are based on statutes or
regulations, the process is often politicized because governments have
considerable discretion in interpreting the meaning of “national interests,”
“net benefits,” and “national security.” As a result, foreign SOEs may face
not only legal and market pressure, but also political pressure to change
governance. This case of institutional mismatch has the greatest potential
of generating positive influence on the investing SOE’s governance
practices. This Article labels this scenario as positive institutional mismatch,
where there may be positive inward influence derived from the outward
investment.
The gist of Table 3 suggests that China’s SOEs are more likely to
adopt internationally-recognized corporate governance practices when they
invest in places of positive institutional mismatch and are much less likely
48
See Hydro Worldwide, NORSK HYDRO, fig.1, http://www.hydro.com/en/AboutHydro/Hydro-worldwide/ (illustrating the worldwide activities of Norsk Hydro and its
relative involvement in each country).
49 Brian J. Aitken & Ann E. Harrison, Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela. 89 AM. ECON. REV. 605, 605 (1999); Anh Dang, How
Foreign Direct Investment Promote Institutional Quality: Evidence from Vietnam, 41 J.
COMP. ECON. 1054, 1054 (2013); Holger Gorg & David Greenaway, Much Ado about
Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment? 19 WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 171, 171 (2004); Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, Does Foreign Direct
Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through
Backward Linkages, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 605, 605 (2004).
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to do so if they mainly invest in places of institutional match (i.e. countries
with similarly weak or even worse institutional conditions). It raises an
empirical question: in what types of foreign countries do Chinese SOEs
mainly invest? Do Chinese SOEs mainly invest in countries of positive
institutional mismatch, such as the United States? Extant literature has
focused on Chinese SOEs’ outward investment in Africa. While the SOEs
have contributed some significant economic development to Africa, their
governance, social, and environmental practices fail to meet international
standards by a wide margin. 50 If Africa or other countries with weak
corporate governance regimes are the main investment destinations, it
indicates that Chinese SOEs’ global expansion would face little normative
pressure to change their governance practices. But governance reform
potential is more likely to occur if they mainly invest in advanced
economies, especially those with regulatory processes scrutinizing
investments by foreign SOEs.
The macro-institutional distance between the origin country and the
destination country of investment provides a broad-brush baseline of
foreign SOEs’ governance change potential. But not all SOEs, even from
the same country, are the same. There are organizational-level variations
that may bring about different inbound influence from outward investment.
This Article considers two micro-organizational conditions, which are
commonly examined in international business literature: the firm’s entry
modes and types of investing entities.
Existing literature has shown how institutional distance between
the home country and the host country may influence a firm’s
internationalization strategies. 51 A recent study shows that Chinese SOEs

50

See Namukale Chintu et al., Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in Africa: Myths and
BUS.
J.
(Mar./Apr.
2013),
Realities.
IVEY
http://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-in-africamyths-and-realities/ (stating that Chinese SOEs fall short of “good governance” standards
traditionally accepted in the international community, but these shortcomings are due to
China’s limited experience in internationalization); Patrick J. Kennan, Curse or Cure - China,
Africa, and the Effects of Unconditional Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 84, 88 (2009),
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol27/iss1/4 (arguing that China’s investments in
Africa may have negative effects on local populations’ social welfare).
51 See, e.g., Lorraine Eden & Stewart R Miller, Distance Matters: Liability Of Foreignness,
Institutional Distance And Ownership Strategy, 16 ADVANCES IN INT’L MGMT. 187, 189
(2004) (suggesting that the key element of liability of foreignness is institutional distance
and examines the manner in which institutional distance affects the liability of foreignness);
Saul Estrin et al., The Impact of Institutional and Human Resource Distance on International
Entry Strategies, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 1171, 1171 (2009) (exploring the role of institutional
and human resource distances on foreign investment strategy); Dean Xu & Oded Shenkar,
Institutional Distance and The Multinational Enterprise, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 608, 608
(2002) (analyzing the effect of institutional distance on the normative, regulatory and
cognitive dimensions on foreign market entry strategies); Delia Ionascu et al., Institutional
Distance and International Business Strategies in Emerging Economies (William Davidson
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tend to choose joint ventures rather than acquisitions as the entry mode,
because acquiring an existing business increases the likelihood of facing
regulatory or political hurdles. 52 While the choice of entry modes is
affected by institutional distance between the home country and the host
country, once the choice has been made, the choice can subsequently
produce different levels of inbound influence derived from such outward
activity.
Common entry modes into foreign markets include two categories:
equity-based and non-equity based. Non-equity based entry modes are
exporting and licensing. Because non-equity based entry modes have little
exposure to the local corporate governance system of the host country, it
would induce only marginal inbound influence on the foreign SOE’s
governance. Equity-based entry modes can be divided into two types by
ownership: wholly-owned and partially-owned operations. Wholly-owned
operations are greenfield investments (i.e. setting up wholly-owned
subsidiaries or branches) and full acquisition of existing local firms in the
host country. Partially-owned operations refer to partial acquisition of
existing local firms or setting up joint ventures with local firms in the host
country. Among all these equity-based types, greenfield investment is
probably most integrated with the SOE’s headquarters and least interacts
with corporate governance of local firms in the host country. Therefore, the
inbound influence on the governance practices of the investing SOE (parent
company) in the home country can be limited. Compared to greenfield
investment, full acquisition will result in a higher level of exposure to local
corporate governance practices in the host country.
Takeovers by foreign investors are often subject to regulatory
approval conditioned on some governance changes of the investing SOE.
Moreover, existing practices in the acquired company may continue and
thus potentially diffuse to the parent SOE in the home country. Partially
owned operations also possess great potential of inbound influence. Partial
acquisitions and joint ventures require SOEs to negotiate and arrange
governance structures with local shareholders. The ownership interaction
and integration create opportunities for foreign SOEs to learn the operation
of the corporate governance system in the host country. Table 4
summarizes the types of entry modes and the levels of potential inbound
influence on corporate governance of SOEs in the home country.
Table 4: Entry Modes and Potential Inbound Influence on Corporate
Governance

Institute, Working Paper No. 728), (2004) (arguing that the “impact of distance varies with
the different aspects of the concept of institutional distance”).
52 Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, supra note 41 at 264.
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Potential Inbound Influence on Corporate
Governance
Low
Low

Low-Medium
Medium-High

Medium-High
Medium High

When deciding how to invest in a foreign country, firms need to
decide whether to invest directly itself or through subsidiaries. As
explained in Section II, a Chinese national champion is typically organized
as a vertically integrated corporate group with a holding company
controlling multiple layers of subsidiaries. If the holding company itself
engages in foreign investment, the holding company will directly encounter
normative pressure in the host country, which suggests great potential for a
change in governance within the holding company. However, if foreign
investment is mainly carried out through overseas subsidiaries, the holding
company may hide behind the layers of ownership and avoid governance
reform. This hierarchical ownership structure creates degrees of distance
between the holding company and its overseas subsidiaries. On the one
hand, the layered ownership may shield overseas subsidiaries from the
state-owner’s influence, which allows more freedom for overseas
subsidiaries to adopt local corporate governance practices in the host
country. On the other hand, the extended distance may weaken the potential
inbound influence on the holding company. Therefore, it suggests a
hypothesis that foreign investments made directly by the holding company
itself rather than through its subsidiaries are more likely to elicit change in
the holding company’s governance practices.
Finally, in addition to FDI, overseas listing is another important
strategy for Chinese SOEs to build international equity connections. Some
Chinese SOEs have listed shares in the world’s leading capital markets
including Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. The institutional relationship between China and the major
capital markets can be characterized as an institutional mismatch.
According to the bonding theory in corporate governance literature, firms
with a view to improve corporate governance, particularly those from
emerging markets, may bond themselves to a better governance regime
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through cross listing their shares. 53 By cross-listing in a stronger
institutional regime, such as the United States, Chinese SOEs must comply
with stricter standards and consequently have better governance. A study
shows that Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong have better payperformance sensitivity than the mainland firms without cross-listing and
the effect is greater for SOEs than private firms. 54 Another study also finds
that Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore have better corporate
governance quality (measured by a combined index) than their counterparts
with only domestic listings. 55 Scholars also find that China’s overseaslisted SOEs have more professional boards of directors, greater accounting
conservatism, higher investment efficiency, and better stock performance
than their domestically listed counterparts. 56 Considering that overseas
listed firms are major members of China’s national champions and their top
management teams (including boards of directors) often overlap with those
of the holding companies, the overseas-listed subsidiaries may diffuse
modern corporate governance practices, such as the use of independent
directors, back to their holding companies. It suggests that the national
champions that have an overseas listed subsidiary are more likely to engage
in corporate governance reform than those without one.
Overall, the theoretical framework built with common ideas in
relevant international business literature assumes that Chinese SOEs are
responsive to market and other institutional pressures in host countries, but
the responsiveness is also affected by organizational factors, such as entry
modes and investment structure. 57 These theoretical predictions are subject
to empirical investigation.
V.
A.

Empirical Evidence

Data and Methodology

This Article empirically investigates whether internationalization
effectively drives the governance reform of China’s national champions, the
SOEs, under SASAC’s control. The period of investigation in this study is

53
John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1757 (2002).
54 Wei Chi & Haiyan Zhang, Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with CrossListing? Evidence from China, 21 CHINA ECON. REV. 150, 150 (2010).
55 Ling Mei Cong, Earnings Quality and Corporate Governance Bonding, 10 CORP.
OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 183, 183 (2013).
56
Mingyi Hung et al., Political Relations and Overseas Stock Exchange Listing: Evidence
from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises 2-4, (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/acy2/Staff/tjwong/HungWongZhangAug2008v8.pdf.
57
Meyer et al. supra note 41, at 1009-10.
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from 2003, the year of SASAC’s establishment, to 2013. As of the end of
2013, there were 113 SOEs controlled by SASAC. 58
Governance reform, as the dependent variable, will be measured in
two ways: whether the SOE has any outside directors on the board and
whether the SOE’s top management team includes any foreign-educated
executives. In the past decade, the most important governance reform of
these central SOEs has been the institutionalization of the board of directors
and independent directors. In 2004, SASAC began to experiment with the
idea of establishing the board of directors in SOEs under its supervision.
According to SASAC’s initial design, the board of directors generally
should be comprised of no less than nine directors and at least two should
be outside directors; the percentage of outside directors should gradually
increase with improvement in the supply of outside directors. 59 As per
SASAC’s most recent rules, the board size generally should be between
seven and thirteen directors, with a majority as outside directors. 60 Note
that although most of the central SOEs did not have a board of directors
before SASAC’s policy, there were a number of exceptions. For instance,
China Chengtong Holdings Group Ltd, a diversified industrial group,
established the board of directors as early as 1992. These pre-SASAC
boards were comprised of insiders only and some had only chairman and
vice-chairman without any other board members. 61 Unlike the pre-SASAC
board, the new board model that SASAC promotes features outside
directors.

58 At the beginning of SASAC’s establishment (2003), there were close to 200 SOEs under
SASAC’s control. SASAC has a goal to reduce the number of the SOEs down to 50-100,
mainly through the strategies of mergers and acquisitions among the enterprises. This
Article focuses on the reform pattern of the existing 113 SOEs. For the list of the central

SOEs, see Yangqi Minglu ( 央 企 名 录 ) [Name List of SOEs],
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/c1725422/content.html.
59
Guanyu Guoyou Duzi Gongsi Dongshihui Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) (关于国
有独公司董事会建的指意（行）) [Directive Opinion on the Building of the
Board of Directors in Wholly-State-Owned Companies] (promulgated by the State-Owned
Asset Supervision & Administration Commission of the State Council, published June 10,
2004) No. 229, art. 16, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85921/c359263/content.html.
60 Notice of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the
State Council on Issuing the Interim Measures for the Standard Operation of the Board of
Directors of a Central Enterprise in the Pilot Program on Board of Directors, (promulgated
by the State-owned Asset Supervision & Administration Commission of the State Council,
Mar. 20, 2009), art.22, CLI.4.118357(EN) (Lawinfochina).
61 Hongye Guo, Waibu Dongshi Dongshihui Shidian de Tupodian – Fang Zhongguo
Chengtong Jituan Dongshizhang Mazhengwu (外部董事董事会点的突破点 – 中国
通 集  董 事   正 武 ) [A Breakthrough of the Experiment of Boards with Outside
Directors – An Interview with the Chairman of China Chengtong Holdings Group: Zhengwu
Ma],
DIRECTORS
&
BOARDS,
no.
1,
2009,
at
http://www.dongshihui.com.cn/Magazine/ArticleDetail/551.
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The adoption of outside directors creates the appearance that
China’s SOEs are converging with the international standard (or the AngloSaxon model). While this governance change could be more in form than
substance, as the board of directors lacks the power to appoint top managers
and outside directors are often retired government officials or former SOE
executives, it may be an encouraging step forward to substantive
governance change. This Article uses the existence of outside directors on
the board to represent a type of governance change.62 The data regarding
whether and when the SOE has a board of directors and outside directors
were manually collected from the personnel appointments announcements
and enterprise reform releases posted on SASAC’s website. Corporate
websites, annual reports, securities prospectuses and news reports are also
used as supplementary sources. According to the data collected through
this methodology, as of 2013, forty-five of the 113 SOEs had at least one
outside independent director on the board. 63
Whether the SOE has any foreign educated executive is the other
indicator of governance change. As the SOEs become multinational firms,
their management teams may include professionals with international
experience. My previous research shows that the SOE executive labor
market is overwhelmingly dominated by system-insiders and only a
marginal minority of the CEOs have any foreign education experience.64
Staffing with foreign-educated executives is a change of this governance
tradition. This Article collected data on educational backgrounds of the
CEOs and vice CEOs of the 113 SOEs as of 2013. Biographic information
was collected from corporate websites, annual reports and prospectuses,
government websites and documents, industrial association websites, and
news reports. There are 639 executives (113 CEOs and 526 vice CEOs).
Of the 639 executives, fifty-six hold a foreign degree; and of the 113 SOEs,
thirty-six have at least one foreign-educated executive.
Internationalization, as the independent variable, will be focused on
international equity linkages. As illustrated in Section IV, equity
connections have greater potential to trigger governance change, compared
to non-equity connections, such as exporting. International equity
connections may be constructed in many forms and will be tested in the
following ways. First, international equity connections can be made
through cross-border joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions. Data on
62 If the SOE has at least an independent director, it is coded as 1; if not, it is coded as 0. It
would be ideal to use the number of independent directors as a dependent variable. However,
in many cases, the exact number of independent directors cannot be confirmed.
63 Note that there are cases where the board of directors was announced to be established but
the positions of outside directors were not filled or could not be confirmed through publically
available data. Such cases were not included in the study. This typically happened for firms
that announced the intention to establish a board in 2012 or 2013.
64 Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career
Approach, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743, 770 (2013).
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cross-border joint ventures as well as mergers and acquisitions were
manually collected from the SDC Platinum Database. The transactions
include deals by the parent company and its subsidiaries in the period of
2003-2011. An SOE’s degree of internationalization is operationalized as
the number of deals accumulated from 2003 to year t-1. 65 Year t is the data
year for the dependent variable. Correlation coefficients will be computed
to examine the relationship between the accumulated number of deals (at
year t-1) and the dependent variables (at year t).
Second, the central SOEs’ overseas greenfield establishments are
another type of equity connections that expose the SOEs to foreign
institutional pressure. Data on the number of the central SOEs’ overseas
subsidiaries were collected from the Directory of Overseas Investment
Institutions, a database maintained by the Ministry of Commerce of China.
The database contains the new establishments of overseas investment
entities subject to the Ministry of Commerce’s approval. 66 While not all
establishments of overseas operations are subject to regulatory approval, the
data can serve as an estimate of the number of overseas greenfield
subsidiaries. 67 The database covers the central SOEs’ investments as early
as 1983, but most of the investment occurred after 2000, the year in which
the “going global” policy was formally introduced. According to the
database, as of 2012, the central SOEs established 1,680 overseas
operations. The degree of internationalization is measured as the
accumulated number of overseas subsidiaries toward year t-1. Correlation
coefficients will show the relationship between the accumulated number of
subsidiaries (at year t-1) and the dependent variables (at year t).
Third, overseas listing is another way to build international equity
connections. Simple linear regression will be used to examine the
relationship between the time of overseas listing and the time of introducing
independent directors.

65
Ideally, it would also include the volume of the transactions. Unfortunately, the SDC
Platinum Database does not provide the dollar amount of many of the transactions.
66 The database is accessible at Jingwai Touzi Qiye (Jigou) Minglu (境外投企（机构）

名 录 ) [Name List of Overseas Investment Companies (Agencies)],
http://wszw.hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/fecp/fem/corp/fem_cert_stat_view_list.jsp.
67
Guowuyuan Guanyu Touzi Tizhi Gaige de Jueding (国院关于投体制改革的决定)
[Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System], Guo Fa [2004] No.20,
(promulgated by the State Council, July 16, 2004, effective July 16, 2004), LEXIS China
Online, htttp://www.lexiscn.com (stating the State Council’s Decision declares that all of the
central SOEs’ overseas investments should be subject to approval or notice, depending on
the size of the investment); Jingwai Touzi Guanli Banfa (境外投管理法) [Measures on
the Administration of Overseas Investment] Order of the Ministry of Commerce [2009] No.
5, (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 16, 2009, effective May 1, 2009),
LEXIS China Online, htttp://www.lexiscn.com (providing the latest conditions under which
the investment would be subject to approval by Ministry of Commerce).
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Finally, this Article will use logistic regressions to examine the
relationship between internationalization and governance attributes.68 The
dependent variables will be whether there was any outside director on the
board and whether there was any foreign-educated top manager in 2013.
The independent variables will be various internationalization indicators,
including the accumulated number of acquisitions toward 2011, the
accumulated number of joint ventures toward 2011, the accumulated
number of overseas subsidiaries as of 2012, and whether the group has an
overseas-listed firm. 69 The control variables will include: logged revenues
(2010) to control for firm size, ROA (2010) for efficiency, 70 and whether
the SOE has vice-ministerial rank. 71 Groups that hold a higher status in the
government system (i.e., vice-ministerial rank) would be more impervious
to international pressure, as they are closer to the inner circle of China’s
domestic political power.
B.
Results
Table 5 shows the number of the central SOEs’ overseas
acquisitions, joint ventures, and subsidiary establishments by country in the
period of 2003-2011. Hong Kong has been an important place for the
central SOEs’ activity in overseas acquisitions, joint ventures, and
subsidiaries. However, Chinese SOEs’ investments in Hong Kong very
often are simply “round-tripping” – where Chinese firms take money
offshore, dress up in financial secrecy, then return back home to enjoy the
tax benefits available only to foreigners. 72 Moreover, the SOEs often use
Hong Kong incorporated companies to engage in investment in other
68

Logistic regression is used to model dichotomous outcome variables. The dependent
variables (whether the SOE has at least one independent director and whether the
management team includes any foreign educated executive) have binary outcomes (i.e., yes
or no).
69 The data years vary because the data collection process for the variables started and ended
at different times. The time difference would not significantly change the outcomes as the
numbers of deals do not change significantly from year to year. As to the variable of whether
the group has an overseas listed firm, it is coded 1 if the SOE has an overseas listed firm; 0
if without an overseas listed subsidiary.
70 The 113 central SOEs are not publicly traded companies and therefore do not have an
obligation to publish their financial performance or other information. SASAC occasionally
disclosed some of these SOEs’ individual financial data. The latest release was the 2010
data.
71 Of the 113 central SOEs, fifty-three hold vice-ministerial ranks in the government
administration system. The top managers of these vice-ministerial level SOEs are directly
appointed by the Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party.
72
Randall Morck et al., Perspectives on China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 39 J.
INT’L BUS. STUD. 337, 340 (2008); Dylan Sutherland & John Anderson, The Pitfalls of Using
Foreign Direct Investment Data to Measure Chinese Multinational Enterprise Activity, 221
CHINA Q. 21, 24-25 (Mar. 2015); Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s Round-Tripping
FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications (Latin Am./Caribbean and Asia/Pac. Econ. and Bus.
Ass’n, Working Paper No. 24, 2004).
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countries, which makes Hong Kong more a portal than a destination of the
SOEs’ foreign investment. 73 Excluding Hong Kong, the top countries of
the central SOEs’ acquisition activities are Australia, Canada, the United
States, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. These countries (except
Singapore) are liberal markets as per the varieties-of-capitalism literature, 74
politically mature democracies, and within the common law family. In
other words, the central SOEs’ acquisition activities take place significantly
in countries whose institutional environments are very dissimilar from
China, which features state ownership, authoritarian government, and the
civil law system (considered a “bad” corporate law regime as per the “law
and finance” literature). 75 Australia, Canada, and the United States are also
the countries that have regulations specifically addressing concerns about
investment by foreign SOEs. This high degree of institutional mismatch
suggests Chinese SOEs could face great normative pressure on their
governance structure when entering these markets.
Table 5: Overseas Investment Deals of China’s National Champions, 20032011 76

73

Location of Acquisitons
Number of Acquisition
Deals (%)

Location of Joint Ventures
Number of JV Deals (%)

Hong Kong
198 (35.5%)
Australia
76 (13.6%)
Canada
47 (8.4%)
United States
27 (4.8%)
Singapore
20 (3.6%)
Brazil
18 (3.2%)
United Kingdom
16 (2.9%)
Nigeria
8 (1.4%)
Kazakhstan
8 (1.4%)
Chile

Australia
26 (12.3%)
Hong Kong
21 (10.0%)
United States
21 (10.0%)
Canada
11 (5.2%)
Russia
11 (5.2%)
Saudi Arabia
8 (3.8%)
Taiwan
7 (3.3%)
Indonesia
6 (2.8%)
Japan
5 (2.4%)
India

Location of Subsidariy
Establishements
Number of Subsidairy
Establishments (%)
Hong Kong
360 (15.5%)
United States
91 (3.6%)
United Arab Emirates
64 (2.8%)
Australia
62 (2.7%)
Singapore
55 (2.4%)
British Virgin Island
54 (2.3%)
Saudi Arabia
48 (2.1%)
Russia
45 (1.9%)
Germany
39 (1.7%)
Indonesia

Morck et al., supra note 72, at 339-340.
Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, VARIETIES of CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 19 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds.,
2001).
75 Rafael La Porta et al., supra note 46, at 1113 (arguing that the common law system is
better able to protect investors than the civil law system).
76 Raw data on acquisitions and joint ventures are manually collected from the SDC Platinum
M&A database; raw data on subsidiary establishments are manually collected from
Directory of Overseas Investment Institutions published by Ministry of Commerce of China.
74
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8 (1.4%)
Indonesia
8 (1.4%)
Others
124 (1.4%)
Total
558 (100%)

5 (2.4%)
South Korea
5 (2.4%)
Others
85 (40.3%)
Total
211(100%)

39 (1.7%)
Zambia
38 (1.6%)
Others
1,431 (61.5%)
Total
2,326 (100%)

Chinese Aquisitor (by type)

Chinese JV Partner (by
type)
Parent Company
77 (34.5%)
Subsidiary
134 (63.5%)
Total
211 (100%)

Investing Entity

Parent Company
90 (16.1%)
Subsidiary
468 (83.9%)
Total
558(100%)
Ownership Stake After
Acquisition
<50 percent
77 (13.8%)
>=50 percent
190 (34.1%)
Unknown
291 (52.2%)
Total
558 (100%)

Equity Stake in JV

Average Stake
68.9% (N=267)

Average Stake
48.9% (N=129)

Parent Company
192 (8.3%)
Subsidiary
2,134 (91.7%)
Total
2,326 (100%)

<50 percent
36 (17.1%)
>=50 percent
93 (44.1%)
Unknown
82 (38.9%)
Total
211(100%)

Table 5 also shows that, excluding missing data, a majority of the
deals are acquisitions of absolute controlling stakes. The average
acquisition of a controlling stake was 68.9%. The popularity in acquiring
controlling ownership suggests Chinese SOEs may be more interested in
being an active controller than a passive observer in corporate management.
Their control interest is often suspected especially when there is a great
degree of institutional mismatch between China and the investment
destinations.
Table 5 further shows that 83.9% of the acquisitions are done
through the downstream subsidiaries rather than the parent companies in the
corporate groups (i.e. the holding companies directly under SASAC’s
control). As discussed in Section IV, the subsidiaries are embedded in the
business group network controlled by the holding company and ultimately
by the party-state. This ownership structure can effectively shield the
holding company and the party-state from disclosing their governance
practices and even hide actual practices behind subsidiaries. In such cases,
the holding companies are not directly exposed to foreign normative
pressure; therefore, governance influence, if at all, tends to be limited to the
subsidiaries.
In addition to direct acquisitions, joint ventures are another type of
international equity connections. Australia, the United States, and Canada
again have the highest concentration of the foreign joint venture deals.
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About 35% of the joint ventures are established through the parent
companies, much higher than acquisition deals, where there are only about
16% via the parent companies. Because joint ventures are usually not
subject to foreign investment regulatory reviews in the host country, parent
companies themselves, even without using subsidiaries as a shield, can still
maintain obscurity about their governance practices to foreigners.77
Table 5 also shows the geographic distribution of subsidiary
establishments. Hong Kong again tops the list, as it has been used as a main
portal to foreign investment. Unlike mergers and joint ventures, subsidiary
establishments are not obviously concentrated in a few advanced economies,
but, rather, are widely dispered in a large number of countries. No single
country (except Hong Kong) exerts any significant influence. Diverse
investment locations may dilute institutional pressure from any particular
country. Moreover, most (91.7%) of them are established through
subsidiaries rather than parent companies, which distance the parent SOEs
from foreign institutional pressure.
Table 6 further shows the correlation between various
internationalization indicators and whether the central SOE has any outside
director on its board. The degree of internationalization, whether measured
as the number of overseas acquisitions, the number of overseas joint
ventures, or the number of overseas subsidiary establishments, has a very
weak or virtually zero correlation with the existence of an outside director
on the board. Investments directly made by the parent companies
themselves do not present any better chance of adopting an outside director.
Furthermore, investments in Australia, Canada, and the United States also
do not provide a meaningful positive correlation. In contrast, the high
degree of institutional mismatch theoretically may generate regulatory or
normative pressure to change governance. Internationalization is also
virtually irrelevant to whether the SOE has any foreign-educated executives,
as shown in Table 7.

77 As shown in Table 2, all the foreign investment regulations only regulate acquisition of an
existing business rather than creation of a business entity such as a joint venture.
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Table 6: Point-Biserial Coefficients between Internationalization and Outside
Directors
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

All Deals

.008

-.027

-.049

-.067

-.111

-.120

-.141

-.006

Deals by Parent Company

-.045

-.091

-.074

-.084

-.132

-.126

-.169

.046

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

.123

-.031

-.024

-.045

-.084

-.093

-.119

.009

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

.110

-.003

-.028

-.057

-.106

-.116

-.125

-.021

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded) by Parent
Company

-.037

-.085

-.032

-.010

-.101

-.109

-.172

.073

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included) by Parent
Company

-.038

-.085

-.032

-.019

-.109

-.119

-.182

.086

Deals in Australia, Canada,
USA by Parent Company

-.023

-.067

-.079

-.086

-.128

-.123

-.173

.027

All Deals

.082

-.039

-.024

-.037

-.043

-.086

-.099

.051

Deals by Parent Company

.103

-.032

-.004

-.019

-.026

-.072

-.071

.052

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

-.065

-.023

-.052

-.058

-.024

-.080

-.041

.111

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

-.062

-.050

-.061

-.074

-.064

-.113

-.082

.046

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded) by Parent
Company

-.022

-.053

-.058

-.001

.020

-.065

.059

.126

Deals in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included) by Parent
Company

-.022

-.065

-.069

-.014

.006

-.074

.048

.103

Deals in Australia, Canada,
USA by Parent Company

---a

-.040

-.041

056

.038

-.046

-.057

-.044

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

All Establishments

-.052

.015

.146

.013

.006

-.018

-.032

.008

Establishments by Parent
Company

-.052

.058

.131

.121

.054

.121

.162

.168

Correlations between
Number of Acquisitions
and Existence of Outside
Directors

Correlations between
Number of Joint Ventures
and Existence of Outside
Directors

Correlations between
Number of Overseas
Subsidiaries and Existence
of Outside Directors
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Establishments in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

-.067

.051

.084

.041

.049

.031

.058

.120

Establishments in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

-.047

.101

.136

.105

.077

.046

.052

.165

Establishments in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded) by Parent
Company

-.046

.063

.037

.026

-.018

-.039

.047

.107

Establishments in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong
Included) by Parent
Company

-.049

.056

.029

.014

-.038

-.032

.066

.161

Establishments in Australia,
Canada, USA by Parent
Companies

-.037

.022

.004

-.014

-.067

-.075

.107

.097

Ｎ

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

113

Deals are accumulated to the prior year. For example, in 2005, the correlation is between
the number of deals accumulated toward 2004 (t-1) and whether the firm had an outside
director in 2005 (t). Advanced economies include countries according to IMF Advanced
Economies List (World Economic Outlook, October 2012, p. 180).
Point-biserial correlation is a measure of the strength of a relationship between one
continuous variable and one dichotomous variable. The correlation coefficient is between 1
(perfect positive correlation) and -1 (perfect negative correlation). When the correlation
coefficient is close to zero, it means virtually no correlation. It is generally considered a
weak positive correlation if the coefficient is between 0.1 and 0.3; a weak negative
correlation if between -0.1 and -0.3.
a All the observations have zero deals; therefore, no value can be provided.
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Table 7: Correlation between Internationalization and Foreign-Educated Top
Managers
Existence of
Foreign-Educated
Executives (2013)
(1)

Number of ForeignEducated Executives
(2013)
(2)

All Deals

.089

.139

Deals by Parent Companies

.145

.107

Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

.071

.060

Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

.098

.157

Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies
(Hong Kong Excluded)

.194

.157

Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies
(Hong Kong Included)

.205

.166

Deals by Parent Company in Australia, Canada,
USA

.148

.149

All Deals

.156

.173

Deals by Parent Companies

.191

.148

Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong
Excluded)

.093

.214

Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong
Included)

.109

.240

Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies
(Hong Kong Excluded)

.194

.157

Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies
(Hong Kong Included)

.161

.193

Deals by Parent Companies in Australia, Canada,
USA

.071

.030

All Establishments

.039

-.028

Establishments by Parent Companies

.133

.185

Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong
Kong Excluded)

.009

-.025

Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong
Kong Included)

.013

.004

Establishments by Parent Company in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong Excluded)

.063

.162

Establishments by Parent Company in Advanced
Economies (Hong Kong Included)

.093

.182

Establishments by Parent Companies in Australia,
Canada, USA

-.037

.042

Accumulated Number of Acquisitions (2011)

Accumulated Number of Joint Ventures (2011)

Accumulated Number of Subsidiary
Establishment (2012)
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Ｎ
Column 1 reports point-biserial correlation coefficients that measure the relationship between a
dichotomous variable and a quantitative variable. Column 2 reports Pearson correlation coefficients that
measure the relationship between two quantitative variables. The correlation coefficients are always
between 1 (perfect positive correlation) and -1 (perfect negative correlation). When the correlation
coefficient is close to zero, it means virtually no correlation. It is generally considered a weak positive
correlation if the coefficient is between 0.1 and 0.3; a weak negative correlation if between -0.1 and -0.
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Figure 1 shows a simple linear regression on the time of an SOE’s
overseas IPO (initial public offering) and the time of its establishment of
outsider directors. 78 It shows that earlier overseas listing is associated with
later, rather than earlier, adoption of outsider directors. In theory, a parent
SOE that is exposed to international corporate governance through its
overseas-listed subsidiary should adopt outsider directors earlier than a
parent SOE who has not been exposed as long to international corporate
governance. However, the findings here cast doubt over the idea that
international influence is a main driver of the central SOEs’ governance
reform.
Figure 1: Relationship between Time of Overseas Listing and Time of
Institutionalizing Independent Directors
2014
2012
Time of
Institutionali2010
zing
Independent2008
Directors
(Year) 2006
2004
1990

y = -0.16x + 2,330.73
R² = 0.14

1995

2000
2005
2010
Time of Overseas Listing (Year)

2015

Table 8 shows logistic regressions on internationalization
indicators and governance attributes. Models 1-8 show the relationship
between internationalization and existence of any outside directors on the
board. Note that in Models 2, 4, 6, and 7, all of the odds ratios for
international indicators are close to one, suggesting virtually no effect of
internationalization on the existence of outsider directors. The odds ratios
for the number of acquisitions (.760, Model 3) and the number of joint
ventures (.367, Model 5) made by parent companies in
Australia/Canada/USA are less than one. It means that parent SOEs that
have more acquisitions and joint ventures in countries with high
institutional mismatch are less likely to have outsider directors on the board.
This finding is contrary to the theoretical prediction. Having an overseas
listing subsidiary increases the odds of having an outside director on the
board in the parent SOE, but the effect is small (1.841, Model 8).

78 Some Chinese national champions have multiple overseas listed subsidiaries. Figure 1
uses the time of the earliest overseas IPO in the corporate group.
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Models 9-16 show the relationship between internationalization
and existence of any foreign educated executives. Note that the odds ratios
of the number of overseas acquisitions (.998, Model 10), joint ventures
(1.063, Model 12), and overseas subsidiary establishments (.998, Model 14)
are close to one, indicating virtually no relationship between these
internationalization indicators and existence of any foreign educated
executives in the parent SOE. Both the number of acquisitions (1.391,
Model 11) and the number of joint ventures (1.332, Model 13) made by
parent companies in Australia, Canada, and the U.S. have positive effects
on the existence of foreign educated managers, but the effects are small.
Moreover, having an overseas-listed subsidiary significantly reduces the
odds of having a foreign-educated executive in the parent SOE by 73.9%
(=1-0.261). The result is contrary to the expectation that overseas listing
would indirectly expose the parent SOE to international corporate
governance and thus increase the chances of including a foreign-educated
professional in the top management team.
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For control variables, SOEs with larger revenues are more likely to
adopt outside directors but generally less likely to have foreign-educated
executives. More profitable firms (measured by ROA) are more likely to
have outside directors and foreign-educated top managers. The viceministerial SOEs in the government system are less likely to have outsider
directors on the board but more likely to have foreign educated executives.
VI.

Implications

A. The Convergence-Persistence Debate
A major debate in comparative corporate governance scholarship
since the turn of the century has been focused on the future of national
corporate governance systems in the era of globalization—will systems
converge on a universal model (especially the Anglo-Saxon model) or will
they continue to retain their national characteristics?
The debate has reached a theoretical impasse between marketimperative theories predicting global embracement of shareholder primacy
and path-dependence theories predicting persistence of national institutions
that protect domestic vested interest. 79 China, despite its enormous
economy, is glaringly absent in the debate, particularly in the works that set
the fundamental framework of analysis. The persuasive power of these
competing theories would be limited without China.
According to the convergence school, capital market integration
through cross-border mergers and acquisitions as well as overseas listing is
a strong driver of governance convergence. 80 International mergers and
acquisitions connect firms of different governance systems and often
require changes in the governance structure of acquiring or acquired firms,
or both. Overseas listing connects the listing firm to foreign investors and
requires the firm to adopt governance rules set by the foreign stock
exchange and relevant regulators, making the governance structure of the
listing firm converge on the model of the listing jurisdiction. 81 Unlike the
convergence school, the persistence theories suggest limited convergence
for SOEs embedded in China’s idiosyncratic state capitalism.
Recent SOE reforms in China, such as launching the board of
directors and institutionalizing independent directors, indicate at least some

79
For the major pieces in the debate, see generally CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6-14 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark. J. Roe eds., 2004) (discussing
forces inducing convergence and forces inducing persistence in corporate governance
systems).
80 Toru Yoshikawa & Abdul A. Rasheed, Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical
Review and Future Directions, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 388, 390 (2009).
81
Coffee, supra note 53, at 1799-1800.
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“formal convergence” 82 or “de jure convergence” 83 toward the AngloSaxon model. Ostensibly, the adoption of Anglo-Saxon practices appears
to be encouraging evidence to convergence theories. However, preliminary
empirical findings in this Article raise questions about whether
internationalization is an apt explanation for Chinese SOEs’ governance
change, particularly for those deeply embedded in the political and
economic network controlled by the state owner. Why do Chinese national
champions’ international investment activities have little bearing on their
governance reform pace? If it is not internationalization, what is the main
driving force for their governance reform? This Article offers some
possible explanations for the weak relationship between international equity
connections and the central SOEs’ governance change.
First, the idea that international equity connections either through
FDI or overseas listing can push for governance change of the parent SOEs
assumes that there is some diffusion of governance practices flowing from
the host country back to the headquarters in the home country. However,
the diffusion influence may be diluted through layers of ownership that
shield the parent SOE from international pressure to reform. As shown
previously in Table 5, a majority of the investment deals are done through
subsidiaries rather than the holding companies themselves. Available
information suggests there is often limited communication between the
overseas subsidiaries and their parent companies headquartered in
Beijing. 84 This investment structure and limited communication may
weaken the potential governance influence. Moreover, while the top
investment destinations are advanced economies with regulatory processes
scrutinizing investments by foreign SOEs, they only account for a minority
of the transactions. As of the 558 acquisitions, only 150 of the deals are
82 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function,
49 AM. J. COMP. L., 329, 332 (Spring 2001).
83 See Tarun Khanna et al., Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A
Cross-Country Analysis, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 69, 71 (2006) (defining de jure
convergence as the adoption of similar corporate governance laws across countries and de
facto convergence as similarities in actual practices); id. at 76-81 (finding empirically strong
evidence of de jure convergence, though not on the U.S. style, and no evidence of de facto
convergence).
84 Interview with a manager of central SOE’s listed subsidiary who managed legal issues of
the company’s overseas acquisitions (May 21, 2011); interview with an executive of central
SOE’s overseas subsidiary in North America (Dec. 10, 2013). News reports also often report
that the parent SOEs have little tracking ability over their overseas subsidiaries’ activities.
See, e.g., Bingning Wang, Zhongshiyou Fanfu Yanshen Zhi Haiwai Yewu Lvgongxun
Jieguan Zhuoshou Chongzheng ( 中石油反腐延伸至海外 功接管着手重整 )
[CNPC Anti-Corruption Extends to Overseas Business, Gongxun Lv Takes on the Task to
Reform], CHINA TIMES, May 24, 2014; Bang An, Yangqi Haiwai Zichan Jianguan Queshi
Youxiao Zhidu (央企海外管缺失有效制度) [The Lack of Effective Supervision over
Central
SOEs’
Overseas
Assets],
CAIJING
(Mar.
20,
2015),
http://comments.caijing.com.cn/20150320/3844611.shtml
(stating
the
lack
of
communication between the foreign subsidiaries and the parent company).

2015]

CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS

119

invested in Australia, Canada and United States; and of the 150, only
twenty-six are by holding companies themselves. As a result, China’s
national champions may have insufficient direct exposure to environments
of high institutional mismatch.
Second, it entails an inquiry into Chinese SOEs’ globalization
motivation. The Chinese government formally ushered in the “going global”
policy in 2000. According to the official statements, the “going global”
policy is aimed at participating in international technology cooperation and
competition, take full advantages of international and domestic markets,
encourage external processing trade, resources exploration as well as
international construction contracting and develop a collection of
multinational companies and well-known brands. 85 Corporate governance
improvement seems not a primary consideration from Chinese
policymakers’ perspective. Consistent with the government’s policy,
existing empirical studies focus on non-corporate governance factors and
confirm that market size expansion and natural resources acquisitions are
important motives for Chinese SOEs’ outward direct investments. 86
Also, individual firms may not be motivated to improve corporate
governance through FDI. As we have seen, Hong Kong accounts for a large
portion of the foreign investment deals. It is believed that most of Hong
Kong transactions are through shell companies for “round-tripping” rather
than real investments. 87 Therefore, this form of foreign investment does not
really expose the investing SOEs to any institutional pressure in the host
country, let alone generating any positive flow-back effect to their
headquarters. As the Chinese government recently has completely phased
out all preferential treatments for foreign enterprises,88 it is to be observed
how this policy change will reshape the SOEs’ foreign investment
motivation and destination choices.
85 Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Dishige Wunian Jihua Gangyao (国民和社会展
第十个五年划要) [Guidelines on National Economic and Social Development of the
10th Five Year Plan] (promulgated by the 4th Meeting of the National Congress, Mar. 15,
2001), http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm.
86 See Peter J. Buckley et al., The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct
Investment, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 499, 499 (2007) (arguing that natural resource seeking is
one of the main reasons for China’s FDI); Luke Hurst, Comparative Analysis of the
Determinants of China's State-Owned Outward Direct Investment in OECD and Non-OECD
Countries, 19 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 74, 74 (2011) (arguing that market size expansion and
natural resources are reasons for China’s outward direct investment); Ivar Kolstad & Arne
Wiig, What Determines Chinese Outward FDI?, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 26, 26 (2012) (arguing
that China’s outward FDI focuses on large markets with abundant natural resources).
87 Xiao, supra note 72.
88
In the past, China gave a variety of favorable treatments for foreign investors, but this
preference policy began to change in 2006. In 2007, China enhanced its supervision over
foreign investments involving national security sectors. In 2008, the unified Corporate
Income Tax Act, which treats domestic and foreign corporations alike. As of Dec. 1, 2010,
China terminated the last two tax preferences (urban maintenance and construction tax and
education surcharge) for foreign investors.

120

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

While Chinese policymakers might not intend governance
improvement through international trade or outward direct investment, they
indeed took overseas listing as an important internationalization strategy to
improve SOE governance. 89 Scholars have shown that overseas listed
SOEs have lower earnings management, more professional directors on the
board, higher investment efficiency and greater firm valuation than their
domestically listed counterparts. 90 However, preliminary empirical
evidence in this Article indicates that the positive effects are limited to the
listed subsidiaries and not effectively reflected in their parent companies.
The lack of positive diffusion to the parent companies may be related to the
typical way of how Chinese SOEs crafted their overseas listings. The
conventional strategy has been to carve out the crown jewel assets of the
group and bundle them into the listed firm while leaving bad assets and
other problems in the unlisted part of the corporate group, usually the
holding company. 91 This assets segregation strategy may practically
concentrate complex corporate problems in the holding company and thus
make the governance reform of the holding company more challenging and
insensitive to international influence.
Finally, the behavior of China’s SOEs is determined not only by
market forces but probably more by the government’s decisions. It is often
the Chinese government rather than the market that selects which firms to
engage in reform. The Chinese government determined which firms could
list shares publicly and abroad. 92 SASAC selected in batches which SOEs
were eligible to experiment with the board of directors, independent
directors and other reform measures. 93 SASAC together with the Party’s
Organization Department consider factors (e.g. political loyalty) other than
market demand when appointing top managers. 94 While there is no direct
89

Niuyue Shangshi Yangqi Yida 68 Jia, Jixu Guli Yangqi Haiwai Shangshi (上市央企
已达 68 家，鼓励央企海外上市) [Already 68 NYSE Listed Central SOEs, Continue
Encouraging More], SECURITIES DAILY, Aug. 24, 2008 (reporting then-SASAC chairman’s
statements in a press conference regarding the purposes of overseas listing).
90
See Mingyi Hung et al., supra note 56, at 22-26 (showing that overseas listed SOEs tend
have lower profitability and more professional boards than the domestically listed SOEs). .
91 CARL WALTER & FRASER HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: INSIDE CHINA’S STOCK MARKETS
99 (2003).
92 The initial public offering (IPO) system in China is approval-based system. But the
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission is considering a registration-based system in
replace of the approval-based system.
93 For instance, in 2004, seven SOEs were selected in the first batch to institute a board of
directors; afterwards, many SOEs in several batches were included to participate in the
reform. A recent example is in July 2014, SASAC selected six SOEs to experiment with
“four major reforms” (i.e. creation of a state-owned assets operation company,
implementation of mixed ownership, marketization of the top management team, and
establishment of anti-corruption inspection committees).
94
See Lin, supra note 64 at 789-791 (noting that an investigation of Chinese SOE executive
backgrounds show that factors such as political loyalty play a role in determining SOE
leadership).
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evidence showing how Chinese policymakers prioritize SOEs on the reform
agenda, it seems that the degree of internationalization is an unimportant
factor in determining who gets reformed first. The reform pace is more
determined by complex domestic forces than by international market or
regulatory pressure.
Over the past decade, China’s national champions have made some
headway toward international standard practices (such as adopting the
board of directors and independent directors), but their reform pace appears
largely unrelated to their activity in international investment or exposure to
global capital markets. Their (at least) formal governance change lends
some support to convergence, but the impetus for change seems to have
little to do with their degree of integration with international markets.
Neither the convergence nor persistence side alone offers a full explanation.
B. China’s SOE Reform Forward
With the political transition in 2012, China’s SOEs have entered a
new round of reform. The reform agenda appears ambitious and
comprehensive, ranging from ownership to various corporate governance
issues. Among other changes, “going global” remains a key strategic policy
for corporate growth. 95 The recently unveiled “Silk Road Economic Belt”
policy, which seeks to establish new trade and transport links between
China, Central Asia, and Europe, involves a tremendous amount of overseas
infrastructure investment typically undertaken by the SOEs under
SASAC. 96 Thus, the Chinese national champions are likely to continue
their important roles in China’s global expansion.
Chinese SOEs often perceive foreign investment reviews in host
countries as unfriendly or discriminative. 97 This perception partly induces
Chinese SOEs to use subsidiaries to engage in their overseas expansion in
order to avoid opposition in the host country. 98 But the use of subsidiaries,
sometimes chains of subsidiaries, may exacerbate the agency problem in
95
Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Di Shier Ge Wunian Guihua Gangyao (国民经济和社
会 发 展 第 十 二 个 五 年 规 划 纲 要 ) [Guidelines on National Economic and Social
Development of the 12th Five-Year Plan] pt. 52 (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://ghs.ndrc.gov.cn/ghwb/gjwngh/201109/P020110919590835399263.pdf.
96 See Dingding Chen, China's 'Marshall Plan' Is Much More, DIPLOMAT, Nov. 10, 2014
(explaining the meaning behind China’s “one belt, one road” plan); Jeremy Page, China Sees
Itself at Center of New Asian Order, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2014 (explaining China’s plan on
“Silk Road Economic Belt”).
97 See, e.g., Chester Dawson and Elena Cherney, China Diplomat Assails Canada’s
Restrictions on Foreign State Enterprises, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-oil-patch-diplomat-assails-canadas-investmentrestrictions-on-foreign-state-owned-enterprises-1412948502 (discussing China’s top
diplomat’s criticism towards Chinese SOEs’ being unfairly treated in Canada).
98 To be sure, besides political concerns, there are some economic reasons such as tax
benefits to invest through subsidiaries.
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SOEs. Globalizing SOEs have a “triple” agency problem. 99 The first
agency relationship exists in which the citizens of the country as nominal
shareholders (principals) task politicians (agents) to monitor the SOE’s
behavior and performance. Politicians may use SOEs to serve their own
interests rather than pursing the objectives mandated by the citizens. But
citizens have limited control over politicians, especially in a political regime
where democratic elections are prohibited. The second agency relationship
exists where politicians delegate managers to manage the SOE. The
managers may have objectives diverging from the objectives of citizens and
politicians. If the SOE is globalized through subsidiaries, a third agency
relationship exists between the headquarters and the subsidiaries. Overseas
subsidiaries may escape their principals’ monitoring; as the Chinese
proverb says “Heaven is high and the emperor is far away.” It has been
reported that SASAC and the parent SOEs headquartered in Beijing have
little tracking over foreign subsidiaries’ activities and there is ample room
for overseas managers to engage in corruption.100 It is hard to expect that
the “going out” policy would generate any positive flow-back effects to the
parent SOEs if they have little knowledge about what is going on in their
subsidiaries.
In very recent years, SASAC has introduced many regulations in an
attempt to intensify monitoring over SOE overseas subsidiaries. 101 In
March 2015, SASAC further announced that it will purchase third party

99

Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational
Companies, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 919, 931 (2014).
100 See, e.g., Bingning Wang supra note 83; Meiti Cheng Yangqi Haiwai Yewu Cun Fubai,
Guoyou Zichan Liushi Hen Pubian (媒体称央企海外存腐 国有流失很普遍)
[Media Reports Corruption in Central SOEs’ Overseas Business, Squandering State-Owned
Assets
is
Common],
PEOPLE
DAILY,
May
26,
2014,
http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0526/c1002-25066234.html (discussing the corruption
in China’s overseas business which has caused squandering of state-owned assets).
101 In response to an outbreak of SOE overseas investment scandals, SASAC promulgated
Provisional Measures on Supervising Central Enterprises’ Overseas Assets (2011) and
Provisional Measures Managing Central Enterprises’ Overseas Property Rights (2011) and
Provisional Measures Managing Central Enterprises’ Overseas Investment (2012). As of
2011, 27.3% of the about 2000 overseas subsidiaries of the central SOEs were running at a
loss and 72.7% were making profits or breaking even, according to the Department Head
(Mr. Ziming Shi) of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce
Press Conference. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China,
Shangwubu Guojiatongjiju Guojiawaihuiguanliju Gongtong Juban "Duiwai Zhijie Touzi
Tongji Zhidu Sheli Shi Zhounian Ji 2011 Niandu Zhongguo Dui wai Zhijie Touzi Tongji
Gongbao Xinwen Fabuhui" (商部 国家局 国家外管理局共同“外直接投
制度立十周年《2011 年度中国外直接投公》新布会)
[PRC Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and State
Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly held "The Tenth Anniversary of Setting up
Statistical Measures for the Direct Outward Investment & Press Conference on Public Report
on Chinese Direct Outward Investment Statistics for the year 2011”], (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/slfw/201208/20120808315863.shtml.
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services from accounting firms through a bidding process to audit SOEs’
overseas assets. 102 Enhancing supervision over SOEs’ overseas activities
has also become part of the government’s anti-corruption campaign. But
the monitoring effectiveness so far seems limited as SASAC’s resources are
unable to handle the scale and complexity of the SOE overseas assets. 103
Ironically, foreign investment reviews in host countries perhaps may
alleviate the agency problem to some extent by acting as an additional
mechanism to track SOE overseas operations and safeguard state-owned
assets from being squandered. Rather than simply viewing foreign
investment reviews as hostile, SASAC may take foreign regulatory reviews
as an opportunity to identify possible problems associated with SOEs’
foreign operations.
C. Foreign Investment Regulations and Beyond
Foreign investment reviews can easily get politicized as the key
concepts (e.g. national interests and national security) in the regulations are
so loosely defined that they allow domestic interest parties to escalate a
business decision to a political controversy. The poor transparency of
Chinese SOEs further creates a convenient setting to play a politicization
drama. In the face of potential political challenges in the host country,
Chinese SOEs may use several strategies to avoid hostile encounters. For
instance, they may use chains of subsidiaries or even individual managers
as investment entities to hide their sensitive identities. These strategies
unfortunately make the governance of Chinese SOEs more obscure to
outsiders and increase agency and corruption problems. The host country
may lose economic benefits if the investment is killed in the politicalized
debate. At worst, it creates a vicious circle. To turn the vicious circle into
a virtuous one, Chinese SOEs should make efforts to improve their
governance quality. But it is also important for the host country to keep its
regulatory review decisions based on rational deliberation of facts rather
than driven by irrational fear. 104
Since the key concern of foreign SOE investment is that the foreign
government may interfere with the SOE management and extend its
102

Guoyou Zhongdian Daxing Qiye Jianshihui 2015 Niandu Jizhong Zhongdian Jiancha
Xiangmu He Jingwai Guoyou ZichanJiancha Xiangmu Fuwu Caigou Zhaobiao Gonggao (国
有重点大型企事会 2015 年度集中重点目和境外国有目服采
招公告) [Procurement and Tenders Notice for 2015 State-Owned Key Enterprise
Supervision Board’s Focused Inspection Items and Overseas State-Owned Assets Inspection
Services
]
(promulgated
by
SASAC,
Mar.
17,
2015)
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85901/c1809041/content.html.
103 See Bingning Wang, supra note 83 (discussing the need for anti-corruption measures);
Bang An, supra note 83 (discussing the need for better monitoring of the SOEs).
104 See generally Zhang, supra note 25 (arguing that current foreign investment reviews
regarding Chinese SOE investments are often dominated by fear rather than based on rational
analysis).
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tentacles to the invested entity in the host country, regulators in the host
country typically want to make sure the investing SOE can make
commitments to good corporate governance, which often means the
invested subsidiary should operate independently of its parent SOE. The
independence demand may limit positive influence diffused from the
subsidiary to the parent SOE. Nevertheless, given that positive flow-back
influence is likely elusive due to politics in the SOEs’ home country and
many other factors such as managerial incentives, the independence or
isolation policy is consistent with the host country’s interest, at least from a
short-term perspective.
Public controversies about Chinese SOEs’ international
investments often have been concentrated in the foreign investment review
process which acts a first-line safeguard against threats to the host country’s
national interests. But we should note that a vast majority of foreign
investments either pass regulatory screening or proceed without triggering
any regulatory scrutiny. 105 Therefore, the practical issue for most foreign
investments is about how foreign investors after entry in the host country
operate their business entities, including economic, social, and
environmental performance.
This continuous exposure to foreign
institutional pressure is another potentially important source for governance
change. Thus, the question is how effectively the host country monitors
foreign investors’ on-going performance. For instance, it is often believed
that many Chinese SOEs use their overseas subsidiaries to engage in corrupt
activities. 106 If a Chinese SOE uses its U.S. subsidiaries to bribe “foreign
officials” (including Chinese officials), it may incur liability under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) where the Department of Justice and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may jointly or separately
initiate an FCPA investigation. 107 And if the Chinese SOE’s shares are
registered in the United States, it is subject to numerous continuous
disclosure obligations under securities regulations. The SEC used to have
a virtually blank record of enforcement against foreign issuers, but there
seems a recent change in the enforcement passivity. 108 This sort of ongoing
105 Australian, Canadian, and U.S. regulators periodically publish the number of approved
and rejected applications. FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 20132014 (2015), http://www.firb.gov.au/content/publications.asp; INDUSTRY CANADA,
INVESTMENT CANADA ACT: QUARTERLY STATISTICS, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/icalic.nsf/eng/h_lk00015.html; COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR CY 2013 (2015), http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-reports.aspx.
106
See, e.g., Bingning Wang, supra note 83 (discussing the need for anti-corruption
measures).
107 See ROBERT W. TARUN, BASICS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2006),
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub1287_1.pdf (providing an overview of the
FCPA).
108 See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively By Renting U.S.
Securities Laws? 75 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 335 (2005) (finding very little enforcement against
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oversight may play a more important role in protecting host countries’
interests and influencing foreign SOEs’ economic, social, and
environmental practices than the entry screening of foreign investment
reviews. Host countries should not be so obsessed with one-shot foreign
investment reviews while being oblivious to a raft of available regulatory
tools that can protect their own interests on a continuing basis.
VII.

Conclusion

This Article has tried to investigate whether internationalization
explains Chinese national champions’ governance reform patterns.
Preliminary empirical findings in this Article suggest that Chinese SOEs’
international investment activity appears virtually irrelevant to their
governance reform pace. It casts a shadow over the optimistic view that
international exposure would be an effective driving force to change the
SOEs’ governance practices. A complex combination of domestic politics,
investment motives, investment structure, and locations restrict the direct
linkage between internationalization and governance change. This Article
provides a better understanding of the complexity of governance change in
the age of globalization. It provides an innovative view for Chinese
regulators with regard to the value of foreign investment reviews in a host
country. It calls for a depoliticized decision-making process in foreign
investment regulatory regimes to create a virtuous circle for both investing
SOEs and host economies.
This early effort to understand the governance implications of
Chinese SOEs’ globalization raises important questions for future research.
Fundamentally, is globalizing Chinese SOEs desirable? The global
expansion of Chinese SOEs may have an effect of reversing China’s
privatization efforts over the past three decades. If internationalization
plays a limited role in the national champions’ governance reform pace,
what should be expected out of their global expansion? Are the globally
growing SOEs crowding out private enterprises in the Chinese economy
and beyond? It should be noted that the recent phenomenon of globalizing
SOEs is not limited to China but many other economies such as Norway
and Malaysia where state capital plays an important role in allocating
resources. 109 Given that SOEs are closely connected with their home
countries’ economic and political institutions, an immediate question that
comes to mind is whether all SOEs are the same. Existing literature

foreign issuers). But see Roger Nelson Silvers, SEC Enforcement of Foreign Firms: Is
Bonding Really a Myth? (Univ. of Mass., Working Paper, Feb. 2012) (noting an increase of
SEC enforcement against foreign issuers).
109 See Cuervo-Cazurra et al., supra note 86, at 919 (discussing the rise of state-owned
enterprises in international business).
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provides sparse analysis on comparative SOE governance. 110 There may be
a variety of SOEs across countries. Even within national borders, diversity
may exist. For instance, while preliminary evidence in this Article suggests
that the governance change of China’s central SOEs has been largely
unrelated to their degree of internationalization. It is uncertain whether the
empirical findings are equally applicable to provincial or local SOEs in
China. It has been proposed that local SOEs are subject to less government
prerogatives and are more market-oriented. 111 It requires future empirical
research to confirm this proposition. If it is true, then regulators should be
sensitive to the diversity of SOEs, rather them treating them all alike.

110

There are only a few studies on comparing state capitalism and SOEs. See Aldo
Musacchio & Sérgio G Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and
Their Implications for Economic Performance, (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper, No. 12108, June 2012) (discussing the relationship between different state capitalism and SOEs);
Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
2917, 2917 (2012) (examining how government ownership in the United States, Brazil,
China, and Europe may make corporate law design less desirable for private companies).
111 See Ming Hua Li et al., Varieties in State Capitalism: Outward FDI Strategies of Central
and Local State-Owned Enterprises from Emerging Economy Countries, 45 J. INT’L BUS.
STUD. 980, 980 (2014) (discussing how local SOEs are subject to less governmental pressure
and display greater market orientation).

